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Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) : 
How Far can P3P Guarantee the Respect of the 
Data Protection Directive Requirements? 
By Jean-Marc Dinant (jmdinant@fundp.ac.be).  
The opinion expressed below are those of the author.  
This paper has already be presented at IFIP Conference on User Identification & Privacy Protection, Stockholm, 14 June 1999 
Key words: Privacy, Data Protection, Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Internet, Invisible Processing, P3P, PICS, W3C, Law and 
Technology Convergence, Cookies, Processor Serial Number, Global Unique Identifier, HTTP 
Abstract: Code of conduct, self-regulation by the industry, enforcement by law, quality label and Privacy Enhancing Tech-
nologies are some of the solutions available today to promote or ensure privacy on the Web. Among the PETs, P3P 
seem today be the major technical response from the industry to solve privacy problems on the Internet. It still remain 
difficult to estimate the accuracy of the P3P approach before the implementation and namely before knowing the de-
faults setting and the kind of information given to the average netizen.  
From the legal point of view, the utilisation of P3P will not exempt data controllers from other duties like providing 
an access, -and in some cases,- an opposition right, securing the data, collecting not excessive data regarding the de-
clared purpose, etc. In the best case, P3P can just solve the problem of fair information while collecting the data. 
From the technical viewpoint, P3P will not solve existing privacy problems created by the conjunction of browser 
chattering, invisible automatic hyperlinks to third parties and cookies, by the Intel Processor Serial Number or by the 
Global Unique IDentifier created by Microsoft. 
Depending on implementation, P3P can be a good solution to improve privacy on the Net, athought it will not be, at 
the present stage, the panacea to solve privacy misuses on the Internet. 
1 The privacy killing side of the Internet Technology 
Before examining the adequacy of a technical disposal to ensure and/or to promote the privacy on the Internet, it ap-
pears worthwhile, - in spite of the fact that such approach remains too unusual in the scientific community -, to analyse 
the privacy killing side of the Internet technology. As a matter of example, we will focus this analysis not on the entire 
Internet but on the HTTP protocol as it has been widely implemented on common browsers. This field of investigation 
is very narrow because it excludes  
• the privacy killing hardware and namely the problem of the Intel Processor Serial Number 1 or the trans-
mission of the Ethernet card identifier; 
• privacy killing piece of software like the Microsoft Personal Identification Number stored in each Word 
or Excel document; 
• others Internet protocols widely implemented in common browsers like POP3, SMTP, FTP or NNTP 
and…TCP/IP. 
•  
                                                          
1 A description of the Intel PSN controversy can be found on http://www.bigbrotherinside.com. Intel announced on January 1999 
that he was planning to include a unique Processor Serial Number (PSN) in every one of its new Pentium III chips (earlier im-
plementations in PII for laptops have been reported). According to Intel, the PSN will be used to identify users in electronic 
commerce and other net-based applications. Many privacy advocates organisations has protested and asked the FTC to oblige In-
tel to suppress the accessibility of the PSN via the Internet.  
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But, at the same time, this arbitrary limitation permits a deep investigation of what happens on the net while surfing. 
This analysis should be done for every Internet protocol. This paper focuses on HTTP because it is the most widely 
used protocol and because it can appear at first glance as being inoffensive from a privacy point of view.  
Besides privacy harmful content lying in HTML code and embedded in JavaScript2 or Java applets3, the HTTP protocol 
in himself provides at least three characteristics which, combined each with others, forms a privacy killing cocktail 
widely and daily used by cybermarketing companies. 
1.1 The browser’s chattering 
Every surfer know that typing http://www.website.org/index.htm means something like “show me the page named 
“index.htm” on the server www.website.org by using the HTTP protocol. One can conclude that no more than the 
TCP/IP address of the surfer and the file he wants to see are transmitted to the Web site. This is not correct. Here below 
are listed some of the data systematically transmitted in the HTTP header while doing the HTTP request. 
TABLE I :AUTOMATIC BROWSER CHATTERING WHILE DOING HTTP REQUEST 
 
HTTP Var. Opera 3.50 Netscape 4.0 Fr Explorer 4.0 UK 
GET GET /index.html HTTP/1.0 GET /index.html HTTP/1.0 GET /index.html HTTP/1.0 
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0(compatible; Opera/3.0; 
Windows 95) 3.50 
Mozilla/4.04 [fr] (Win95; I ;Nav) 
 
Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 4.01; 
Windows 95) 
Accept :  image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, 
*/* 




Referer :   Where.were.you/doc.htm Where.were.you/doc.htm 
Language :  fr fr-be 
 
The technical definition of those fields can be found in the RFC 19454 for HTTP 1.0 or in the RFC 20685 for HTTP 1.1. 
We can notice  
 The first line is the only which remains indispensable 
 In the Accept: line, every browser is telling that the netizen is using Windows 95 (why?). Netscape adds 
that the browser version is a French one. Every browser give his own name, version and sub-version 
identification. 
 While describing the accepted formats, Microsoft tells every site that the netizen’s computer has Power-
point, Excel, and Word installed on it. 
 Opera doesn’t disclose the referring page. 
 Opera doesn’t reveal the language spoken. Netscape reveals that the netizen is French speaking. Micro-
soft reveal that the netizen is Belgian, French speaking.  
                                                          
2  See namely the Cuartango Hole which permits to a web site to read any file on the netizen PC while accessing to him : 
http://www.nwnetworks.com/cuartango.htm  
3  The latest version of Mcafee permits the disabling of such malicious applets or Active-X controls.  
4  http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc1945/rfc1945  
5  http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2068/rfc2068  
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1.2 Invisible hyperlinks6 
Hyperlinks are the added value of Internet. It permits browsing from one continent to the other simply by a mouse 
click. What is hidden to the eyes of the common user is that classical browsing software enables to include HTTP re-
quests to download images to be included in the HTML page code. Those images have not to be located on the same 
server as the one who has received the original call for a particular Web page. In this case, the HTTP_REFERER vari-
able contains the referring page reference, i.e. the main page in which the images will be located. Within others words : 
if a Web site includes in its Web page in HTML an invisible link to an image located on the Web site of a cybermarket-
ing company, this last one will know the referring page before sending the advertising banner. While doing a research 
on a search engine the name of the Web page includes the keywords typed. 
1.3 Cookies 
The cookies issues have already been widely discussed7. The SET-COOKIE is taking place in the HTTP response 
header8, namely in invisible hyperlinks. If a duration is mentioned9, the cookie will be stored on the netizen’s hard disk 
and sent back to the Web site originating the cookie (or Web sites from the same sub domain). This sending back  will 
take the form of a COOKIE field taking place in the browser chattering described above. When put together with 
browser chattering and invisible hyperlinks, it means that, by default10, a cybermarketing company knows all the key-
words typed by a particular netizen11 on the search engine on which he is advertising, the computer, operating system, 
browser brand of the netizen, the TCP/IP address he has using and the time and duration of the HTTP sessions. Those 
raw data permit to infer some new data like12 
1. The country where the netizen live 
2. The Internet domain to which he belongs 
3. Sector of activity of the company employing the netizen 
4. Turnover and size of the employing company 
5. Function and position of the surfer within this company 
                                                          
6  Invisible hyperlink seems us a better wording than the wording used by David Kristol in the so-called cookies 
II specification (http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2109/rfc2109 ). D. Kristol spoke about unverifiable hyper-
links. In fact, those hidden hyperlinks are verifiable. But, due to the fact that they are not visible and automatic, 
they remains widely unverified. 
7  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, “ The Internet and Privacy Legislation: Cookies for a Treat?”, 
http://www.wvjolt.wvu.edu/wvjolt/current/issue1/articles/mayer/mayer.htm; Stephen H. Wildstrom, “Privacy 
and the Cookie Monster”, Business Week, December 1996. 
8  Technically speaking, it is also possible to implement cookies in JavaScript or in the <META-HTTP EQUIV> 
fields located in the HTML code. For more information see 
http://www.junkbusters.com/ht/en/ijbfaq.html#cookies 
9  Cookies with no duration specified are called “session cookies” and disappear when the browser is unloaded or 
when the socket close. 
10  Recent browsers provide the ability to block unwanted cookies. See point 4.1 below. 
11  More precisely, those data are linked to a particular personal computer that can be used by many people. From 
a legal point of view, those data has to be considered as personal data, just as it is already the case with plate 
and phone numbers which are considered unanimously as being personal data in the sense of art. 2 a) of the 
European directive 95/46. 
12 Serge Gauthronet, “On-line services and data protection and the protection of privacy” European Commission, 
1998, p.31 and 92 available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/studies/servint.htm 
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6. Internet Access Provider 
7. Typology of Web sites currently visited. 
 
The cookie permits a permanent and unique identifier systematically sent with every request of information while the 
TCP/IP address remains a relatively weak identifier because it can be hidden by proxies and due to its  dynamic charac-
teristic for netizens accessing to Internet by modem. Such invisible profiling has been already done by many US cy-
bermarketing companies and many tens of millions of European netizens are probably profiled in the database of Dou-
ble Click in New York13. 
1.4 The liability of the Internet Industry 
Such a profiling is not “per se” linked to the HTTP protocol, as he has been defined by the W3C14. Even more, the 
HTTP 1.1 protocol definition has explicitly draw the attention of the industry to possible privacy attempts while doing 
the implementation of the HTTP protocol15 : 
– “Having the user agent describe its capabilities in every request can be both very inefficient (given that 
only a small percentage of responses have multiple representations) and a potential violation of the 
user's privacy” [page 68 below] 
– “ It may be contrary to the privacy expectations of the user to send an Accept-Language header with the 
complete linguistic preferences of the user in every request” [page 98] 
– “ The client SHOULD not send the From header16 field without the user's approval, as it may conflict 
with the user's privacy interests or their site's security policy. It is strongly recommended that the user be 
able to disable, enable, and modify the value of this field at any time prior to a request.” [page 118] 
– “HTTP clients are often privy to large amounts of personal information  (e.g. the user's name, location, 
mail address, passwords, encryption keys, etc.), and SHOULD be very careful to prevent unintentional 
leakage of this information via the HTTP protocol to other sources. We very strongly recommend that a 
convenient interface be provided for the user to control dissemination of such information, and that de-
signers and implementers be particularly careful in this area. History shows that errors in this area are 
often both serious security and/or privacy problems, and often generate highly adverse publicity for the 
implementer's company.” [page 143] 
– etc : The word “privacy appears 18 times in the RFC 2068. 
 
By using a specific browser or a technical solution such as Mcafee antiviral shield or a proxy server like the one dis-
tributed by Junkbunster, it is possible to surf without invisible hyperlink and/or with less chattering in the HTTP proto-
col, but, strangely, at the information age, such solution remains widely unused. This last point demonstrates that the 
common surfing programs are privacy killing, by the implementation choices done by the Internet industry and that the 
Internet is not privacy killing in itself.  
                                                          
13  For Double click only, about 26 millions netizens in March 1997 (Gauthronet, op. cit., p. 86) and more then thousand millions of 
cybermarketing banners downloaded each month outside US (ibid., p. 96) 
14  The World Wide Web Consortium is a non profit organisation hosted by Inria (France), MIT (USA) and the University of Keio 
(Japan). The members of this consortium are notably Microsoft, AOL, Netscape, …and Center for Democracy and Technology 
(http://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List). This consortium produce non mandatory but de facto normalisation intended to 
guarantee the interoperability of computers on the Internet.  
15  http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2068/rfc2068 . The page numbering indicated between brackets refer to the numeration of W3C. 
16  Note of the author : From header field is used for naming the referring page 
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1.5 Specification for a privacy compliant cookie. 
The privacy killing side of the cookie lies in to the way in which it has been used. The principle of “notice and choice” 
can easily be applied to a cookie. Under article 10 of the European Directive 95/46, it means that before sending a SET 
COOKIE header, a Web site has to inform the consumer by communicating 
a) his identity,  
b) what information will be stored in the cookie  
c) the purpose for which he intends to use this information.  
d) the recipients of the collected information 
e) which data are mandatory and what happen if not given 
f) the existence of an access and rectification right 
g) the existence of an opposition right if the data are collected for marketing purposes (under art. 14 b) 
 
Having read this short notice on the default home page, the netizen should be able to choose an identifying cookie (like 
UserId=AZFD4309) or an anonymous cookie (like UserId=X17). In fact, this solution has been offered by Double-
Click18 but remains little used19 because the common netizen is unaware of the cookies issue, and even more, of the 
invisible hyperlink phenomenon. 
It becomes then very easy for the Web site to build a dedicated page for the access right of the data subject. While ac-
cessing to this dedicated Web page, the browser will communicate by in his header a identifying cookie, an anonymous 
cookie or no cookie at all. If no identifying cookie is sent, there is no specific information about the netizen. If there is 
an identifying cookie, then it is very easy to access to his specific information and to send him back into the dedicated 
access page. 
1.6 The cookie’s weaknesses for the marketing 
1. There has been a terrible jar when the cookie system has been denunciated by privacy organisations. However, the 
cookie in itself is not privacy killing, but due to the invisible and unfair way in which it has been widely used, he 
has been perceived as a symbol. Following a raising awareness of the netizen versus privacy on the Internet, a sec-
ond cookie specification is under construction and will normally lead to a better privacy protection (RFC 2109).  
2. By storing the identifier on each hard disk of each netizen, the cookie permits systematic authentication, but, at the 
same time, allow the informed netizen to modify, to exchange or to delete his own authentication. The databases of 
cookies stored will lose 90% of their marketing value if the identifier no longer refers to an existing cookie stored 
somewhere on a computer (for instance if a the computer disk crashes, if a new computer is bought or if a cookie 
killer program is used). 
                                                          
17  To be effectively anonymous, all the anonymous users should have the same Id but also the same cookie dura-
tion. Otherwise, the cookie duration can be used as a unique identifier.  
18 http://www.doubleclick.fr/company_info/about_doubleclick/privacy/privacy2.htm  
19  between 5 to 10 opt-out procedures are daily recorded by Double Click, Gauthronet, op. cit., p. 94 
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3. Even if the cookie meta data fields20 have been normalised, the critical VALUE field remains not normalised and it 
became very difficult for the cybermarketing companies to interconnect different cookie databases related to the 
same netizens to draw a global profile. 
4. The data linked to the cookie are quite basic and do not reveal the revenues, the SSN, the physical or electronic 
address, the credit card number, the gender, the education or the family structure of the netizen. Even if those data 
have been collected by electronic forms and are stored in databases with an identifying cookie access key, there is 
no global data definition model permitting the exchange of this particular information. 
5. The ultimate value added for the cybermarketing remains the interconnection of classical databases with virtual 
databases. But before doing this, it is important to get a unique identifier for all the netizens.  
2 description of P3P protocol 
2.1 P3P milestones 
P3P is the anagram of Platform for Privacy Preferences21. They are many steps both at client and at server side to 
achieve a P3P complete process22. 
The netizen will have to fill in a form with some of his personal data like name, address, phone and fax number, SSN, 
CCN, gender, age, etc… Those data will be kept on his own computer. He will specify the purposes for which he will 
afford to communicate some of those data. 
The Web site will have to fill a similar form indicating what kind of data he intends to use and for which purpose. 
When accessing a Web site for the first time, the Web site will reveal his privacy practices, i.e. the data he wants to 
have and for which purpose. If this proposition matches with the privacy preferences of the netizen, the netizen browser 
will then send an acceptance notification identified by a pairwise or site ID (PUID), unique to every agreement the 
agent reaches with the service. 
If the privacy practices of the Web site and the privacy preferences of the netizen do not match, some process of nego-
tiation is foreseen but it is not quite clear how this negotiation will take place. 
When accessing the Web site for the next time, the browser will systematically send this PUID in such a way that the 
Web site can know the privacy preferences matched between the netizen and the Web site. 
                                                          
20  The duration, the path, the secure attribute and the domain allowed to get the cookie back. 
21 The last working draft of the P3P protocol can be found on the W3C Web site at 
http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/WD-P3P-19990407 . 
22  Source : Joseph Reagle, Lorrie Faith Cranor, “The platform for privacy preferences”,                       
Communications of the ACM, Vol 42, No. 2 (Feb. 1999), Pages 48-55. Available as a W3C note at 
http://www.w3.org/TR/1998/NOTE-P3P-CACM-19981106/#anonymity  
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The basis of P3P is thus a contract between the user agent and a service. 
2.2 P3P improvements. 
Two others elements are cornerstones of the P3P protocol. 
2.2.1 RDF 
The first one is the use of the RDF23 (Resource Description Framework) meta language. RDF provides interoperability 
between applications that exchange machine-understandable information on the Web. By using this meta language, the 
electronic agents will be able to use normalised data identifiers all over the Web. If widely adopted, this RDF meta 
format, can solve to problem of the cookie interoperability mentioned above. 
2.2.2 APPEL 
The second one is the ability for client software to download standard disclosures practices. The P3P Preference Ex-
change Language (APPEL24) offers the opportunity to define in a standardised format : “Thus P3P includes a mecha-
nism for exchanging recommended settings. These "canned" configuration files are expressed by APPEL, A P3P Pref-
erence Exchange Language. Rather than manually configuring a user agent, a user can select a trusted source from 
                                                          
23  Resource Description Framework  (RDF) Model and Syntax Specification, W3C Proposed Recommendation,  
05 January 1999, http://www.w3.org/TR/PR-rdf-syntax/  
24  W3C, “A P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL)”,  http://www.w3.org/TR/WD-P3P-preferences  
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which to obtain a recommended setting. These are the settings the user agent will use when browsing the Web on behalf 
of its user”.25 
3 How P3P can fulfil EU data protection directive re-
quirements 
3.1 Some European legal requirements for fair data processing 
They are many fair data processing requirements based on EU directive 95/4626 but we will limit our analysis on the 
following basis requirements : 
– 4 b) the data must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in 
a way incompatible with those purposes. (legitimacy) 
– 4 c) the data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed; (adequacy) 
– 10 ) the controller .. must provide ..:  
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;  
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;  
(c) any further information such as  
- the recipients or categories of recipients of the data,  
- whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible consequences of 
failure to reply,  
- the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the data concerning him (information of 
the data subject) 
– 12 a, b,c ) Member States shall guarantee every data right to obtain from the controller:  (a) without con-
straint at reasonable intervals and without excessive delay or expense:  
– confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being processed and information at least as to 
the purposes of the processing, the categories of data concerned, and the recipients or categories of re-
cipients to whom the data are disclosed,  
– communication to him in an intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and of any available in-
formation as to their source,  
– knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him at least in the case 
of the automated decisions referred to in article 15(1);  
– (b) as appropriate the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the processing of which does not com-
ply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of the incomplete or inaccurate nature of 
the data;  
– (c) notification to third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of any rectification, erasure or 
blocking carried out in compliance with (b), unless this proves impossible or involves a disproportion-
ate effort. (Right of access) 
– 14 b) Member States shall grant the data subject the right: (b) to object, on request and free of charge, to 
the processing of personal data relating to him which the controller anticipates being processed for the 
purposes of direct marketing, or to be informed before personal data are disclosed for the first time to 
                                                          
25  Joseph Reagle, Lorrie Faith Cranor, op. cit. 
26  “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data” (published 
in the OJEC of 23 Nov 1995, L281, p.31).  
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third parties or used on their behalf for the purposes of direct marketing, and to be expressly offered the 
right to object free of charge to such disclosures or uses (Right of opposition to marketing) 
– 25 1.-) The Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third country of personal data which are 
undergoing processing or are intended for processing after transfer may take place only if, without preju-
dice to compliance with the national provisions adopted pursuant to the other provisions of this Directive, 
the third country in question ensures an adequate level of protection (Adequate level of protection) 
3.2 P3P as a fulfilment of EU data protection directive 
EU directive requirement P3P requirement 
Legitimacy [art 4b] P3P in itself offers no guarantee on the legitimacy of the 
processing 
Adequacy [art 4c]) P3P in itself offer no guarantee that the data collected are 
necessary for the declared purpose 
Information of the data subject [art 10] This is the best added value of P3P.  The netizen can a priori 
decide what kind of purpose are legitimate for him. In fact, 
depending on implementation, he will perhaps know the 
purposes of the Web site. The netizen also has the right to 
know the identity of the Web site rather then domain name 
located in the URL 
Right of access [art 12] P3P in himself offer no guarantee on the right of access 
Right of opposition to marketing [art 14 b] P3P in himself can reach this goal with the good client 
settings. One question remains. What will the Web site do if 
a visitor doesn’t want to communicate his data for marketing 
purposes.  
Adequate level of protection for transborder data flow [art 
25]) 
P3P doesn’t perform any check of the kind of data that can 
be transferred outside the European Union 
 
It becomes very clear that P3P can achieve two steps towards better privacy practices, namely by providing a better 
data subject information and by granting a right of opposition towards direct marketing. However, the choice of a P3P 
compliant server will not be sufficient to grant the EU privacy compliance of a particular Web site. This is the sense of 
the opinion27 expressed by the Group 2928 which stated that : “ There is a risk that P3P, once implemented in the next 
generation of browsing software, could mislead EU-based operators into believing that they can be discharged of cer-
tain of their legal obligations (e.g. granting individual users a right of access to their data) if the individual user con-
sents to this as part of the on-line negotiation. In fact those businesses, organisations and individuals established 
within the EU and providing services over the Internet will in any case be required to follow the rules established in the 
data protection directive 95/46/EC (as implemented in national law) as regards any personal data that they collect and 
process. P3P might thus cause confusion not only among operators as to their obligations, but also among Internet 
users as to the nature of their data protection rights.“ 
                                                          
27  Opinion 1/98: Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profiling Standard  (OPS) : 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp11fr.pdf.  
28  Group of all European data protection authorities created by the article 29 of the Directive 95/46/EC 
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4 Conclusion 
4.1 The P3P accuracy versus existing privacy killing technolo-
gies 
The privacy killing implementation by the Internet industry of the HTTP protocol have been detailed in chapter 1. The 
question to be answered is to know if a P3P browser will reduce or not the HTTP chattering, the cookie phenomenon or 
the invisible hyperlinks outside the Web site visited. 
The response to this question is negative. In fact the P3P protocol will increase the HTTP chattering, doesn’t intend in 
itself to regulate the cookie problem and will not give to the user more control versus invisible hyperlinks, namely to 
cybermarketing companies located outside the European Union. 
In fact, the single visible attempt to solve one of those three problems is the cookie opposition mechanism implemented 
in common browsers since version 329. This attempt remains timorous and inadequate for many reasons :  
1. The default setting is the most privacy killing and the average netizen doesn’t know that the cookie is 
widely used by invisible cybermarketing companies to track every keyword typed on search engines. 
2. The cookie blocking mechanism inhibit the reception of new cookies but doesn’t prevent the systematic 
and invisible sending of cookies already received. 
3. Some cookies are useful and not identifying (e.g. preferred language). Others are identifying but privacy 
compliant30. 
4. Several Web sites doesn’t allow client denying cookies. But session cookies are much less privacy killing 
then persistent cookies. Refusing all the cookies can not be a global solution. 
5. Several Web sites (or the Web sites invisibly hyperlinked) send many cookies and a case by case ap-
proach will cause a terrible click fatigue 
6. In some cases, the cookie warning31 is not fair but may scare the average netizen by arguing that he will 
receive less information if he refuses cookies. In fact, he will send less information about him in the fu-
ture. 
7. While installing a new browser, the first site (by default the Web site of the browser producer) to be vis-
ited can send a cookie before the user get the opportunity to deactivate the cookie feature. 
  
Behind the P3P opinion mentioned above, the Group 29 has also produced a recommendation on Invisible Processing 
of Personal Data on the Internet32. By doing this recommendation, the Group intent to urge the Internet industry to 
produce privacy friendly software and hardware, and namely to give full data control to the user. 
                                                          
29  Basically, three options are offered to the netizen : refuse all cookies, accept every cookie, see case by case. 
30  See above, point 1.5. 
31  In MSIE 4.O UK, the cookie warning stands as follow : “In order to provide a more personalised browsing ex-
perience, will you allow this Web site to put information on your computer ? If you click Yes, the Web site 
will save a file on your computer. If you click No, the current Web page  may not display correctly.” The cou-
rageous netizen has then to click on a new button to know the domain (not the sender !) of the cookie and his 
duration. 
32  Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and Automatic Processing of Personal Data on the Internet Performed by 
Software and Hardware, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg15/en/media/dataprot/wpdocs/wp17en.htm  
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After being so deaf towards the W3C recommendation, will finally the Internet industry be receptive to the legitimate 
aiming of more privacy compliant products. The answer to this is two questions :  
1. By who are the Internet browsers producers financed; by the data subject or by the merchants ?  
2. Who has interest to get more privacy ? 
4.2 The P3P as the privacy panacea 
The P3P is sometimes presented as the solution to solve al the privacy problems on the Internet. It is a marketing argu-
ment that can not be verified.  
P3P can effectively provide better data subject information (depending on the choice done at the implementation stage) 
or enhance opposition towards marketing processing. At the present stage, it is very difficult to appreciate the accuracy 
of P3P before knowing the default settings and the way in which APPEL configuration files will be promoted and dis-
tributed. 
P3P will certainly not grant a global privacy compliance towards the basic EU data protection requirements in spite of 
the fact that it may cause this false impression. 
P3P doesn’t solve present problems like the presence and the content of many tens millions European profiles stored in 
New-York without the prior knowledge (and consent) of the data subjects. He will not bring an happy end to the cookie 
Jar or to the Intel PSN controversy. 
4.3 The P3P as an enhanced cookie ? 
In fact, it seems that the P3P has been conceived by the W3C, supported by the Internet Industry to palliate the weak-
nesses of the existing system of cookies for the cybermarketing industry while presenting this protocol as a privacy 
enhancing technology. It seems to be an argument presented by P3P specialists : “ P3P includes two identifiers that 
users can exchange with services in place of cookies”33. Indeed that is the opinion expressed by the people who have 
given the "People's Choice" Orwell award to Microsoft Corp. for the Global User ID Number, Open Profiling System, 
and …the proposed P3P standard34. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
33 Joseph Reagle, Lorrie Faith Cranor, op. cit., in Chapter “Anonymity and cookies”. 
34 http://www.epic.org/alert/EPIC_Alert_6.06.html, point [6]. 
